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Abstract 
The main focus of this paper is on the ‘agency-conflict’ during financial deregulations in the 1980s as the 
potential causality of Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s.  Agency conflict is defined as the conflict of 
interest among the policy makers and agencies (e.g. banks) that arises as a combined effect of 
heteroschedasticity1 of policy shifts at that time and the overall weaknesses of corporate governance of 
the Japanese banks. This paper theoretically and empirically tests the hypothesis that “agency-conflict” 
increases short-term profit and can be a potential cause of the subsequent crisis. First part of the 
theoretical model based on the Bayesian Learning Model explains how agency conflict can increase profit 
in brief and second part of the theory explains how banks can be vulnerable to crisis at the outset of the 
bubble. Moreover, the theoretical model is used as the basis of empirical analyses on the causes to the 
probability of banking crisis. The paper also provides discussion on a number of interrelated structural 
changes and agency-conflicting issues that occurred in the Japanese financial system. However, the 
analyses find that the ‘agency-conflict’ is significant to the probability of banking crisis. 
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1
 The word ‘heteroschedasticty’ is used to mean the variation in efficiency of policy changes. The term is well 
explained in the theoretical part in section 4.1. 
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Financial Deregulation and Crisis: An ‘Agency-conflict’ Case of Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
The policy objective of any financial deregulations is to make a financial sector more 
competitive, profit oriented and to make capable to play the leading role as an intermediary of 
the economy. Usually countries take decision for deregulation in light of country’s own needs as 
well as in compliance with socio-political aspects. Beyond the positive aspects of deregulation, 
can financial deregulation create financial crisis? If yes, when? The answer of these questions is 
explored in this paper from the Japanese experience in the 1990s. 
Japanese financial system was predominantly bank-based and it was highly regulated before 
1980. The banking system of that time was mainly known as ‘Main Bank’ system, where some 
enterprise groups cluster around a bank. Many of the activities of the Main bank system did not 
comply with the usual commercial banking concept. Rather, it is described as a convoy financial 
management, which is also a phenomenon of the Japanese oriental culture. There were financial 
and non-financial arrangements between banks and groups, as well as they were interlocked with 
shares. Moreover, banks enjoyed window guidance of Bank of Japan and some other subsidies 
from the government (see Ito, 1992; Suzuki, 1987).  
While it was a high debate among the Japanese policy makers and pundits whether they 
should adopt complete competitive structure, or to leave some regulating elements that are 
consistent with the Japanese socio-cultural norms (e.g. convoy mechanism), the authority 
initially started deregulations in the mid-1970s with a view to reducing dependency of banks on 
corporate groups with some indispositions. Some other deregulations were namely, interest rate 
deregulation, downsizing interlocking shares, allowing banks to participate into the capital 
market etc. The 1980s was a decade of financial deregulations, but the pace and objective of 
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deregulations hampered substantially due to emergence and burst of the asset price bubble in the 
later half of the 1980s and subsequent banking crisis in the 1990s.    
In the backdrop of Japanese banking crisis and economic stagnation in the 1990s, the 
behavior of the banks’ has raised some issues that have made it necessary to rethink about the 
deregulation process of the Japanese financial system. The emergence and burst of the bubble 
economy in the late 1980s were mostly characterized by the commercial banks’ aggressive 
behavior in credit extensions, relationship between banks and corporate groups, conflict of 
interest among the financial intermediaries and authorities etc. During the crisis, many banks 
(180 up to 2003 according to Deposit Insurance Corporation, Japan) and debtor companies 
failed, huge burden of NPL occurred, and macroeconomic consequences such as deflation, 
recession etc. prolonged. These issues give rise to curiosity regarding why the most successful 
banking system of the 1960s and the 1970s failed? Did the deregulatory measures create any 
conflict of interest in the financial system that has contributed to the failure of the banks?  
Many researchers have already examined the causality of the banking crisis in Japan. Hossain 
(2004, 2005) mentioned that weak corporate governances of the Japanese banks are enough to 
explain the crisis in the 1990s, and the asset price bubble consequences of the late 1980s just 
accelerated the situation to an early crisis. Cargill (2000) provides a long list of the causes such 
as (1) highly regulated system as it was unable to adjust with the new environment after the 
deregulations started, (2) the BoJ created too much liquidity in the late 1980s, with low interest 
rates, and followed it by too abrupt a tightening of monetary policy and these policy failures led 
to wild fluctuations in asset prices, (3) the government was slow in responding to the problems in 
the financial system even after their existence was clear, (4) Japanese taxpayers provided little 
support for the government to use public funds to rescue the banking system, and finally (5) a 
lack of disclosure and transparency by banks and other financial institutions and regulators 
contributed to the delay in the response to the problems. The first causality of Japanese banking 
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crisis described above by Cargill was also supported by Hoshi (2001). Ueda (2000) mainly 
blames the bubble and excessive real estate lending as the causality of crisis.  
Hoshi (2001) and Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) mainly try to establish that slow and partial 
deregulations was the primary causality of crisis. The important question to the end: why was the 
financial deregulation slow and undirected? The answer of this question has not been explored 
adequately in the existing literature.  
Going to the deep of the problem, this paper argues that the causality behind making the 
deregulations slow should be the causality of crisis. In the earlier stage of liberalization, mainly 
during the 1980s, variations in policies (can be measured in terms of time dispersion) were 
higher that makes the deregulations slow and left the outcome away from optimal as a result of 
conflict of interest among policy makers and beneficiaries which is termed in this paper as 
‘agency-conflict’. Explaining different aspect of financial deregulations, this paper argues that 
‘agency-conflict’ among the parties involved in the deregulation process were mainly 
responsible for ‘heteroschedasticity in policy shifts’ that might have potential impact on partial 
deregulations and subsequent crisis. Note that ‘heteroschedasticity in policy’ can be the outcome 
of conflict or mistake and vice-versa, and to some extent, ‘heteroschedasticity in policy’ and 
‘agency conflict’ is substitute of each other. This argument is tested in this paper theoretically 
and empirically. However, no attempt has been made so far to highlight the potential impact of 
agency-conflict as a cause of delayed deregulations and subsequent crisis. 
This paper outlines that the ongoing deregulations did not accompany the measures on time 
to (1) make the banks capable of doing business without depending on the big corporate groups, 
(2) improve the corporate governance of the banks that are able to handle the situation in a 
liberalized environment, and (3) prepare prudential regulations so that bank can not make any 
speculative decision. Moreover, policy makers’ deliberate efforts to retain authority over the 
banks and other financial institutions helped not to take the measures on time that derailed the 
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system from being competitive. There was a contradiction in beliefs and signals from either side 
that created “agency-conflict”, as a result, heteroschedasticity in policy shift made a room for 
moral hazard for the banks with the prevalence of weak corporate governance.  
This paper highlights mainly two issues to explain the agency-conflict in financial 
deregulation process and crisis: 
(1) Heteroschedasticity in policy shift:  As mentioned above, liberalization started through 
financial deregulation in the mid-1970s without clear objective so far for which financial 
institutions could not be able to prepare properly for the changing situation. As a result, financial 
institutions could not cope with the situation instantly and indulged in some speculative behavior 
during the asset price bubble and monetary easing period of the later half of the 1980s. Again to 
curb down asset prices, some measures such as monetary tightening, and some restrictions on 
land transactions were undertaken to burst the bubble that finally made banks vulnerable to 
crisis. As the banks assets were secured by collateral assets, continuing plunge of asset prices 
with the authorities’ intervention made the loans uncollectible, in turn, the crisis started from 
1991. Since the undertaken measures led to some banking and economic crisis, both ‘monetary 
and structural policy changes’ and ‘timing of implementation’ pinpoint the heteroschedasticity in 
policy shifts.  
The heteroschedasticity in policy shift mainly comes from the conflict between (1) fiscal vs. 
monetary authority, (2) authority vs. financial institutions, and (3) financial institutions vs. debtor 
companies like SMEs, real-estate companies etc. Moreover, ongoing financial deregulations 
reflect somewhat conflict with the Japanese society’s norms, as the society believes on convoy 
mechanism, which might go against the competitiveness. 
(2) Corporate Governance: From Hossain’s (2005) study it is clear that weak corporate 
governance issues affect the profitability of the Japanese banks, as well as it might have effect on 
the failure of banks. The corporate governance system of Japanese banks is largely determined 
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by the bank-ownership structure, which limits the check-and-balance in the system substantially 
(IMF, 2000). Due to weak corporate governance the banks could not resist mistakes in policies; 
rather they tried to enjoy the fruits of mistakes. Therefore heteroschedasticity in policy might 
have spill over effect on the corporate governance of banks. However, low profitability 
generated from the main bank system forced banks to do speculative behavior during the 1980s 
comparatively in a more liberalized environment in absence of prudential regulations. By this 
way they acted as a channel for transmitting shocks to the economy. As the banks management 
have been familiar with the regulated system, they were not so efficient in exploiting more 
profitable lending opportunities in a comparatively liberalized economy. So they were not being 
able to judge the quality of assets, as well as it creates moral hazard problem.  
This paper theoretically establishes that at an early stage of liberalization process some 
policies were undertaken on trial and error basis, and policy inefficiencies can be captured 
through the activities of the beneficiaries such as banks. The paper tests both theoretically and 
empirically that the agency conflict increase short-term profit for banks and make banks 
vulnerable to crisis with the presence of random shock like bubble. This is also important to note 
that the agency-conflict made the ongoing deregulations in the 1980s slow and partial as it is 
characterized by the conflict of monetary and fiscal policies, and the weak corporate governance 
of banks left the outcome away from optimal. Moreover, it explains the agency conflicting issues 
more systematically as well as it provides empirical illustrations by determining conflicting 
period, which is not readily available in existing literature.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes structural changes 
in the Japanese financial system, Section 3 describes agency conflicting issues during the 
financial deregulations, corporate governance and profitability of the banks, also a theoretical 
model is developed in this section to explain how a bank can be vulnerable to crisis at the outset 
of the bubble. A theoretical framework is developed in Section 4 to understand how 
 7 
heteroschedasticity in policy shifts leave room for gain in profit as well as how a bank can be 
vulnerable to crisis at the outset of the bubble. The model also provides a basis for further 
empirical analysis. Section 5 provides empirical results of Probit and VAR analysis, and Granger 
causality test and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 2. Structural Changes in the Financial System of Japan    
This section provides an overview of some interrelated structural changes that occurred 
during the 1980s and 1990s in the financial system of Japan. 
The Main Bank System 
The Japanese financial system is predominantly bank-based. Post-war Japanese financial 
system was highly regulated and banks were heavily dependent on BoJ’s (Bank of Japan) 
subsidies (window guidance) and borrowings of enterprise groups. The characteristics of the 
Japanese model of financial system during post-war economic growth included high debt/equity 
ratios, greater reliance on bank loans than securities markets, closer relationship between banks 
and borrowers, extensive corporate cross-shareholding, greater guidance from the government in 
credit allocation etc. The system is well known as ‘main bank’ system.  
It is evident from many research works that this ‘main bank’ system in Japan contributed 
greatly to the post-war economic growth of Japan although the varieties of functions played by 
the main bank were not usually associated with the concept of commercial banking. This type of 
Japanese banking system is characterized by clearly defined structural policy on the part of the 
government for stimulating and maintaining specialization among financial institutions, which 
has been termed as ‘convoy system’ 2  by some economists. It is noteworthy that Japanese 
structural policy was oriented toward particular concrete objectives rather than toward achieving 
                                                 
2
 Suzuki Y. (1987) used the term ‘convoy system’ of management in describing the situation of the absence of 
destructive competition through interest rate control and other regulatory measures during high growth period of 
Japan.  
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maximum competition and leaving the results to the working of the free market (Wallich H. and 
Wallich M., 1976). 
The main bank system had important historical antecedents as the pre-war banking system 
and industrial system (including Zaibatsu) evolved (Aoki and Patrick, 1994). There is a vast 
literature (for example, see Okabe (2001), Aoki et al. (1994) etc.) on how main bank system 
played a very important role in Japanese economy and financial system. The main banking 
system worked through both the financial and non-financial arrangements with the ‘enterprise-
groups’. This structure of Japanese banks might be the so-called “Industrial bank” (also available 
in Germany as House bank) rather than modern commercial bank. Unlike American and many 
other countries’ banks, Japanese banks are allowed to own equity in other corporations. The 
shares of group member firms owned by banks form an important link in the interlocking 
structure of enterprise groups. In addition to interlocking shares, banks provide preferential loans 
and board members to the group affiliated firms. A group bank serves as a screening agent for 
the investment projects of the group firms and stands ready to lend funds whenever they are 
needed (Hoshi et al. 1991).  
Highlights of main deregulations 
Literature review shows that a policy shift toward a greater emphasis on competition was 
induced in the mid 1970s. Along other measures an effort has been made to make banks more 
profit-oriented by easing the dividend restrictions (Wallich, H. &Wallich, M., 1976). As a part of 
intensive and continuous effort to improve the competitive structure, the Certificates of deposit 
(CDs) became available in May 1979; Gensaki3 transactions with CDs (unregulated interest rate) 
became increasingly popular, as there is no transaction tax on CDs. The Tegata4 market, freed 
                                                 
3
 The ‘Gensaki market’ means repurchase agreement market established in 1949 by securities houses. It became 
important in 1970 when FIs and large companies began to participate.  
4
 The Tegata (bill discount) market is a short-term financing market for two-weeks to six-weeks. It was spun off 
from the call market in 1971. 
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from interest rate regulation also grew in the 1980s. During this period, restrictions on fund-
raising in the securities market by firms were removed and major firms became less dependent 
on bank borrowing (Ito, 1992).  
Some other deregulatory measures are worth mentioning. The interest rates for large-amount 
time deposits (LTDs) were deregulated in 1985, thus the share of these deposits in the money 
supply had been increased significantly. The lowering of the minimum deposit amount for 
money market certificates (MMCs) to 10 million yen in October 1987 made those certificates 
more popular among households. The Anti-Monopoly Law Reform of 1977 specified that all 
financial institutions were to reduce their share holdings from 10% to below 5% by December 
1987, by this reform the policy of 1951 again revived. Although this law aimed at dissolution of 
cross-shareholding, but there is no limit about the total number of different stocks a bank can 
hold. By this law, a bank’s holding of different stocks can exceed its total capital, which might 
have risk for the banking business. Since bank’s money are the depositors short-term money, 
share holding in equity of its enterprise groups sometimes may create mismatch in maturity and 
loan portfolio. 
After the collapse of the bubble in 1990, the important structural changes toward universal 
banking type system started by the Financial System Reform Act, 1992 (enforced in April, 1993) 
that allows banks to conduct trust businesses either through trust bank subsidiaries or by 
themselves and securities businesses through securities subsidiaries subject to the permission of 
the Prime Minister. The Financial System Reform Law of 1998 allows banks to conduct 
insurance businesses through subsidiaries from October, 2000. Since March 1998, banks can 
establish bank-holding companies that own a securities subsidiary. Banks have been allowed to 
sell investment trusts at their counter since December 1998. This policy shift toward universal 
banking was explained by Aoki et al. (1994) as- “the bad loans consequences of the bursting 
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bubble result in a weaker banking system that needs further deregulations, particularly permitting 
banks to engage in bond underwriting and related services more liberally”.  
Direction of financial deregulation; Emergence and burst of the bubble 
The structural changes in the financial system have been started from the mid 1970s in the 
form of financial deregulations to increase the ability of the Japanese banking system to meet 
international competition. The deregulations also aimed at dissolution of cross-shareholding5. 
Many have attributed the significant financial liberalization that has taken place to the sharp 
increase in government budget deficits in the late 1970s and the resulting need to sell large 
amounts of government bonds (see Cargill and Royama, 1988).  
These deregulations aimed at strengthening capital market, but it were without directions 
until 1990 in the sense that it neither showed its direction toward full competitiveness since some 
elements of the main bank regime were prevalent nor any other special type of banking by which 
bank can find any substitute of enterprise group. The decade of 1980 might be termed as 
undirected deregulations as like ‘boat without sail’. Aoki et al. (1994) mentioned the banking 
system of that time as ‘market-embedded main bank system’ since some elements of the main 
bank system remained valid; these remaining elements, as I argue, actually created some 
heterogeneity in the market too. Untargeted liberalization, during transition from one regime to 
another, created many problems for the economy and the financial sector. Emergence and burst 
of the asset price bubble during 1988-90, prolonged banking crisis in the 1990s, huge non-
performing loan, economic recession etc. are some of them. Finally the deregulations during the 
1990s destined to the direction of universal banking. 
The developments in regulatory frameworks after the collapse of the bubble (after 1990) and 
at the onset of banking crisis, allow banks to do business in the capital and risk market too. 
                                                 
5
 The Anti Monopoly Law Reform, 1977 was one-step forward in reducing cross-shareholding. Okabe (2001) shows 
that cross-shareholding is gradually reducing in the Japanese financial system.  
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Under these regulatory frameworks, Japanese banks are given license to do conventional non-
banking activities like lease financing, investment and merchant banking, underwriting, 
insurance business etc. Thus, these types of regulatory frameworks allow banks to expand their 
businesses in risk market (security and insurance), capital market (investment banking) as well as 
money market. This model follows universal banking-type system rather than modern 
commercial banking. Diagram-A1 in Appedix-1 clearly depicts the scope of today’s banks’ 
businesses.  
Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), consumer-financing institutions, insurance 
companies etc. are mostly working as a subsidiary company of the banks. They are heavily 
dependent on banks for their funding, of course, the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, these deregulations opened up a wide range of business possibility to the banks that 
indicates a significant change in their structure compared to the structure before 1980. 
3. Agency-Conflicting issues during financial deregulations 
3.1 Heteroschedasticity in policy shift 
This section provides a systematic description of the conflicting issues that might have 
impact on the Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s onward. 
Fiscal vs. monetary policy 
It is widely thought that lack of coordination in fiscal and monetary policy formulation made 
the situation in Japan worse in the late 1980s. Since monetary easing in the early 1980s helped in 
creating the bubble as well as a ground for banks speculative behavior, BoJ explained the action 
of monetary easing as an outcome of fiscal consolidation of the government in the first half of 
the bubble. If expansionary fiscal policy had been implemented at an earlier stage, the official 
discount rate would not have been reduced to 2.5% from 5% within one year in 1986-87. Again 
conflict is seen between these two authorities in their actions taken to burst the bubble. Early 
implementation of expansionary fiscal policy facilitated the monetary authority to pursue tight 
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monetary policy. Government’s effort in curbing land price with monetary tightening helped the 
bubble burst earlier than expected in 1990 which made the banks and other institutions 
vulnerable to crisis. Especially the BoJ can not deny their responsibility for not considering 
banks’ investment situation.  
Another conflicting issue is interest rate hike during the bubble period. BoJ failed to make 
any convincing argument regarding this issue. To prevent the interest rate hike, many argued that 
monetary policy at that time needed to be conducted with the foreign exchange rate as target.  In 
Japan, MoF is mainly responsible for foreign exchange intervention, and BoJ only conducts 
foreign exchange transactions as its agent. As a result, in some cases, foreign exchange 
interventions were not in effect in line with monetary policy (Okina et al., 2001). 
Monetary  Policy vs. Banks 
The combined effect of half-hearted financial deregulations and downward pressure of 
profitability might have influenced the banks speculative behavior to increase their short-term 
profit during the asset price bubble. Monetary easing in the mid 1980s along with structural 
changes indulged banks to expand credit aggressively during the asset price bubble in the late 
1980s.  
With structural changes, the ‘monetary phenomenon’ added up to make the situation more 
critical. In order to counter the recession due to the rapid appreciation of the yen after the Plaza 
Accord in 1985, the BoJ lowered discount rate five times as a part of monetary easing between 
1986 and 1987. At that time, money supply increased more than 10% (Figure 1). During ongoing 
financial deregulations, growth of money supply and lowering discount rate at an extraordinary 
level creates a room for moral hazard for the banks.  
 
 
 
 13 
Figure 1:  Trend of call rate and discount rate 
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The commercial banks have taken this opportunity of protracted monetary easing and they 
started lending aggressively to the SMEs, NBFIs etc. to increase their short-term profit in 
absence of prudential banking regulations, as the deposits were backed by insurance. Also lower 
tax on holding of land and higher tax on transaction of land created demand and supply gap in 
the real estate sector that rapidly increased the price of assets. With these favorable situations, 
banks lent aggressively to the SMEs and contributed in creating the asset price bubble and 
transmitting the shocks to the economy after collapse of the bubble economy. 
Here it is important to note the way the bubble was collapsed. As a part of BoJ’s monetary 
tightening and government’s effort to curb land prices, the bubble started to burst in the later part 
of 1990, asset prices started to fall sharply, many debtor companies became bankrupted, and 
creditor companies had a huge burden of non performing loan (accumulated direct write-offs 
stood around 9% of GDP in 1999; Okina et al., 2001). Up to 2003, 180 banks failed; most of 
them were Regional Tier II banks (relatively small-sized banks operate regionally). This 
prolonged nature of the crisis indicates that the crisis has not been stabilized yet.   
With this backdrop it is relevant to ask the question- were the interventions of authorities to 
stop bubble correct? As the crisis continues from just after burst of the bubble, it is reasonable to 
repose some doubt on the appropriateness of the policies undertaken by the authorities. They did 
not consider or analyze the situations of the banks properly before taking actions to stop bubble. 
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It is hoped that if they would take the measures gradually, the shocks would have transmitted to 
the economy more softly. 
Banks vs. Non-banks and other companies 
With the advent of liberalization, market forces unleashed on the hitherto regulated 
environment. In this market upheaval, banks lost their big customers as they were shifted away 
from bank-borrowing toward other financing including retained profits, corporate bonds, 
securities holdings, international financial market etc. Due to decrease of the large firms’ 
dependency on banks borrowing, banks shifted aggressively their mode of investment to the 
SMEs, NBFIs etc. for real estate businesses (Figure 2). Empirical analysis also supports this 
view.  
The aggressive investment to the SME and other real-estate sector comes through a process 
of asymmetry of information and moral hazard problem. Therefore, burst of the asset price 
bubble in the early 1990 made many SME and real-estate company insolvent, creating a huge 
burden of NPL for the banks. 
Figure 2: Growth of asset ratios over the years  
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* Asset1 denote total ratio of total loans outstanding over total assets  
while Asset3 denote  the ratio of  real estate loans outstanding over total loans outstanding.   
Figure 2 clearly depicts the asset bubble situation where overall loan portfolio of banks 
changes with the changes of real estate loan in their portfolio. 
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Conflict with society’s norm 
It is widely known that Ministry of Finance (MOF) has been very deliberate in asserting 
authority over banks, merging banks, and controlling the system. Moreover, Japanese socio-
cultural activities have been rooted in the form of ‘group activities’ or ‘joint decision’; Zaibatsu, 
Keiretsu, and the main bank system were a reflection of this ‘group’ phenomenon. With the 
financial deregulations, is the authoritarian role of MOF shrinking or is the ‘group phenomenon’ 
of Japanese culture getting eliminated? It is interesting to note that the structural changes in the 
financial system can be explained by the two sides- industrial banking and universal banking6, of 
the same coin ‘convoy system’7. The forming of universal-type banking may validate authorities’ 
expectation as another type of convoy system has been resurrected. Can the crisis therefore be 
called as ‘self-fulfilling attack8’?  
Therefore, by the undertaken deregulations, the financial system of Japan has not been made 
full competitive. It has been modified synchronizing with the characteristics of the Japanese 
society.  
However, the big agency conflicting issues are summarized in Table A2 of Appendix-2 and 
the following figure (Figure 3) is drawn to identify the duration of conflict among the agencies. 
Category ‘0’ (reduction of dependency of large corporate groups) and ‘1’ (corporate governance) 
are completely overlapping and big conflict arises after 1983 when money supply grew with 
ongoing financial deregulations. The undertaken policies during 1983-89 somewhat conflicted 
                                                 
6
 Universal banking includes investment services in addition to services related to savings and loans. This is more 
common in European countries but prohibited by law in the U.S. 
7
 Although Rhodes J. R. (2003) focused on the demise of the ‘convoy system’ of financial regulation, the convoy 
system of financial management has again been revived by making banks as the center point of other non-bank 
financial institutions.  
8
 Although this phenomenon is explained in the second generation models of currency crisis (for example, see 
Flood, Robert and Nancy Marion (1998)), we can explain the transition of Japanese financial system by this 
phenomenon in the sense that when action affected the market sentiment and started a crisis, it fulfills authority’s 
intention to move to a new convoy system (universal banking).  
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with the category 0 and 1 of 1980-89 and therefore, the conflict period is roughly estimated as 
1983-89.  
Figure 3: Graphical presentation of conflict-period based on the conflict-issues  
              described in Table A2  of Appendix-2. 
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Note: 1. Arrow-lines indicate the issues that had conflict over the period. 
          2. The thick area indicates big conflicts as the issues 4, 7 and 9 had big conflict with the issues 0 and 1. 
           
 
3.2 Corporate Governance and Japanese Banks’ Profitability 
The corporate governance issues seem very crucial for the Japanese banking system, as it is 
blamed largely for creating problem for the banks. One of the main important aspects of 
corporate governance of the Japanese banks is its ownership structure. A typical Japanese bank 
has four groups of shareholders: life insurance companies, corporate borrowers of the bank, bank 
employees and other banks. The lack of incentives for shareholders of banks and as employees 
constitute a big portion of the shareholders, there is reluctance in exercising their corporate 
governance power over the management. This issue can be a cause for low profitability of the 
Japanese banks, as the management is reluctant to increase profitability rather than increasing 
shares. 
Table 1 demonstrates the ownership structure of the Japanese banks. Over time it is seen that 
the percentage of banks in which banks and insurance companies alone are the top 3-5 
shareholders, are increasing. This development creates problem for the shareholders to exercise 
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their corporate governance power to the management. Therefore, the management of bank is 
reluctant to increase efficiency. 
Table 1: Percentage of banks in which banks and insurance companies alone are the top 3 
and 5 shareholders 
 1980 1990 2000 
 Top 3 (%) Top 5 (%) Top 3 (%) Top 5 (%) Top 3 (%) Top 5 (%) 
All Banks 41.94 20.43 55.08 34.75 53.27 31.78 
Nationwide 
Banks 
54.55 22.73 63.64 22.73 61.54 23.08 
Regional 
Banks 
38.03 19.72 53.12 37.5 52.13 32.98 
 Source: Yukashoken hokokusho (Company Annual Reports); Courtesy: Masaharu et al. (2004) 
The Japanese banks were under downward pressure of profit during the heyday of the 
Japanese economy and got momentum after liberalization started. What we have discussed in the 
previous sections, undirected liberalization brought much frustration for the banks, moreover 
downward pressure of profit acted as catalyst to behave aggressively for increasing profit during 
the asset price bubble. 
Figure-4: Japanese Banks Profitability during 1964-1998 
 
 
Figure-4 shows that the declining trend of profitability of Japanese banks continued from 
1970 to 1998 except during the asset price bubble. In the main bank regime banks were  enjoying 
window guidance and subsidies from BOJ and the government. Therefore, perhaps banks were 
not much aware about the profit because they were competing among themselves for market 
share rather than profit (Yoshino and Sakakibara, 2002), and they were backed by the corporate 
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group. Lending risk analysis could be biased due to the presence of directors of enterprise firms 
in banks (Table 2).  
The following table demonstrates the economic size of the big six enterprise groups in 1987. 
Each enterprise group consisted at least 3 banks or insurance companies at that time.  
Table-2: Structure of corporate governance of the big companies(FY 1987) 
 
No. of member 
firms 
Total       Bank /    
            Insurance 
Average 
interlocking 
Shares 
Average 
intra-
group 
loans 
Total 
assets 
(billion 
Yen) 
Loan 
share1 
(FY 
1989) 
Board of 
directors 
share2 
(FY1989) 
Mitsui 24 4 17.1 21.94 238,447 5.96 6.69 
Mitsubishi 29 4 27.8 20.17 241,846 7.17 7.08 
Sumitomo 20 4 24.22 24.53 153,202 6.75 6.58 
Fuyo 29 4 15.61 18.20 322,798 6.03 9.38 
Sanwa 44 3 16.47 18.51 377,622 7.30 8.97 
Ikkan 47 5 12.49 11.18 466,250 4.44 12.44 
Source: Toyo Keizai, Keiretsu Kigyo Soran, 1989; Ito T. (1992) 
1Outstanding loans lent by group financial companies/ Total outstanding loans 
2No. of directors sent from group companies/ Total outside board members.    
 
There might have also possibility of window dressing9 in bank’s profit, if it is so, the actual 
profit of banks was lower than the reported one. Caves and Uekusa (1976, pp. 72-83) showed 
that group membership decline a firm’s rate of profit; so does banks profit. The other finding is 
that group firms tend to make significantly higher interest rate than non-group firms. The authors 
also concluded that group bank enjoyed the fruits of maximizing the sum of group firms’ profit.    
With the pace of financial deregulation started in the mid 1970s, capital market became more 
open to the large firms and the large firms’ dependency on banks’ borrowing gradually became 
reduced, also the scope of cross-shareholding was shrinking (Okabe, 2001). As the banks lost 
their large corporate customers, they rushed to find new borrowers and projects. Moreover, 
banks were permitted to participate in short-term bond market partly from 1987. During the 
period, the situation compelled banks to think about the profitability for their survival and they 
                                                 
9Bank sometimes manipulate their financial statements to show a inflated position of their performance by taking 
favor from their own enterprise group.  This unfair means is termed as Window Dressing. It could be a very difficult 
task to get proper information on window dressing in Japan.   
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found themselves in the surface of tough reality. Protracted monetary easing after Plaza Accord 
in 1985 gave fuel in their effort of increasing short-term profit during the 1980s.  
With other macroeconomic factors, the Postal Saving Scheme in Japan might have been 
contributing to the low profitability of banks as it creates somewhat distortion in the financial 
market by paying higher interest rate than bank. The deposit of Postal savings scheme stood at 
around 30% of the total bank deposits due to its favorable interest rate (Yoshino, 2000). For this 
reason, present Koizumi government takes the privatization of postal saving scheme in the top 
priority of agenda.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
4.1 Agency conflict increases short-term profit 
 
How agency conflict can increase short-term profit of banks is explained in this section by 
modifying and extending the Bayesian Learning Model (for details, see Jovanovic and Nyarko, 
1995).  
Suppose there are some policy makers who produce n different decisions during a period of time 
as a process of financial deregulations. Each policy shifts are responded by the agents (e.g. 
banks); agent’s reaction provides a signal to the policy makers and their learning process 
continue as a trial and error basis. What happens to the outcome due to heteroscedasticity in 
policy shift is the main focus of this theoretical framework. 
 
Suppose the efficiency of the decision j can be perceived by the action of bank i (i =1,2,….) to 
increase profit at time t as 
( )[ ]∏
=
−−=
n
j
jitjitjt RRA
1
20
,,
1ξ                                                                    (1) 
where R is the target profit and R0 is the achieved one due to implementation of policy j=1,….,n. 
The mistakes in policies are compounded in this equation (1). The decision would be optimal if 
Rt = R0. Here we assume that the deregulation process continues to make the system more 
competitive and profitable. 
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Again assume that each policy shift leads to a new value of R: 
                   jitjit xR ,, ω+= ,                                                                 (2) 
where ω is a white noise iid normal random variable with mean zero and variance 2ωσ . The 
disturbance ω represents transitory factors that affect the optimal decision.  
 
Now,  
                   
0
,,
)()( jitjitt RxERE == .                                                          (3) 
 
This follows that  
 
( )[ ]∏ +−−= n
j
jitjt xExA
2
.
)(1 ωξ .        
                                                      (4) 
If [ ]2)(xExE j −=θ denote posterior variance over x, given information from the first j policy 
implementations, and if it follows normal distribution with variance 20σ , then applying Bayesian   
rule we have 
j202
2
0
2
σσ
σσθ
ω
ω
+
=
.                                                                                    (5) 
 
Therefore, expected efficiency on j is 
 
( ) [ ]njjt AE 21 ωσθξ −−= .
                                                                                   (6)   
The equation (6) is known as so-called ‘Learning curve’. And variance of ξ is 
( )




+
+= 2
0
2
2
042 12)(
σσ
σ
σξ
ω
ω j
j
AVar                                                               (7) 
 
Our interest is on the variations of efficiency generated from heterogeneity of policy shifts that 
are reflected in banks profit, which we may call ‘heteroschedasticity of policy shifts’. This 
variation in ξ can be obtained by squared coefficient of variation (CV). 
 
The squared coefficient of variation of ξ is 
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( ) 11 12 −+=Ω −nnt υσ                                                                               (8) 
 where 2υσ denote the squared CV for a single decision at time t. 
Jovanovic and Nyarko show that 2υσ exhibits exponential properties (mostly Chi-square 
distribution), and for any intermediate value of j the variance is larger. As number of decisions 
increase, the outcome is becoming more efficient. Now substituting 2υσ  in (8) we may predict 
about the general heteroschedasticity of policy shifts. 
 
On this model assumption, we may define the profitability of banks as 
itntititR εµ +Ω+=                                                                               (9) 
where µ denote fixed profit of banks, Ω denote heteroschedasticity of policy which brings gain in 
profit and εit denote shocks with E(εit) = 0. 
The equation (9) is the basic outcome of my analysis. This equation says that heteroschedasticity 
in policy shifts in a process of structural changes might bring gain in profit for banks as well as 
some random shocks may appear which also bring gain in return for a short period of time. Since 
the heteroschedasticity in policy comes through the conflict of agencies, therefore, agency 
conflict increases short-term profit. 
4.2 Banks become vulnerable to crisis at the outset of bubble 
From previous model we see that heteroschedasticity in policy shift brings gain in profit for 
banks as well as it leaves room for random shocks like the bubble shocks. Therefore, below a 
model is developed to describe how a bank can be vulnerable to crisis after burst of the asset 
price bubble. This model captures both the policy inconsistency and weaknesses of corporate 
governance implicitly. 
Consider a bank can lend or borrow money at rate 
1+ r = Et 




 + ++
t
1t1t
P
PD
 at period t.                                       (10) 
Where r: interest rate,  
           P: the price of the assets, 
           D: return or dividends obtained from the invested assets, 
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For maximizing profit, the equilibrium condition holds at 
                          

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Now substituting  
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; where bt is a bubble term.                                   (12) 
After burst of the asset price bubble bt=0, and a bank’s return for the period t can be expressed as 
[ ]
lossExpectedreturnExpected
dt)(RRER
0t
ti,ti,1tti,t
+=
•+= ∫
∞
=
+ pi
,                                                       (13)           
Here for simplicity, we may assume that the loss i,tR of the bank i is constant over time t, and  
)(t •pi denotes the probability density function that describes probability of failure of a bank at t 
which can be expressed as an exponential function such as  
.0,0
0,e)( tt
<=
≥=• −
λ
λpi λ
 
Now solving (13), we find 
( ) i,ti,1tti,t
i,t
i,1tti,t
R)R(ER
R)R(ER
=−⇒
+=
+
+
λ
λ                                                      (14) 
Assume that Et (Rt+1,i) = Ri* which is the balanced return10 for a bank i.  Therefore, the equation 
(14) takes the form 
( ) i,t*i,t RRR =−λ                                                               (15) 
                                                 
10
 Empirically the balanced return should be the long-term equilibrium return for a banking system.  
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Equation (15) describes that loss of a bank is proportional to the deviation between current return 
after burst of the bubble and the balanced return. Hence λ is estimated as  
( )*RR
R
ˆ
i,t
i,t
−
=λ                                                             (16) 
Therefore, as bank return (or loss) is a function of other factors such as industry-related as well 
as macroeconomic factors, λ  implicitly gives the estimates of parameter of failure of a bank.  
From (16), we may derive the following propositions: 
(1) If a bank behaves speculative during the bubble to increase return, there is possibility to 
decline its profit after burst of the bubble. In that case, Rt,i<R*. Since i,tR  is negative, 
then λ >0. That is there is a positive probability of failure; 
(2) If a bank does not behave speculative, but still its profitability lies below R* it will have 
positive probability of failure. This situation can be explained by the fact that banks 
management is not efficient in exploring profitable lending opportunity; and  
(3)  If a banks Rt,i ≥ R*, then )( •pi =0. Therefore, Rt,i = Et (Rt+1,i). 
Again, we may define *)RR(R 0i,t −−=  where R0 is the initial return of a bank. Then from (13) 
we may write without loss of generality, 
tˆ
0i,t
tˆ
i,ti,t
e*)RR(*)RR(
e*R*RR
λ
λ
−
−
−−=−⇒
+=
                                   (17) 
The equation (17) gives the speed of convergence of a bank’s return to R*. R moves toward R* 
at a speed approximately proportional to its distance from R* and growth rate of Rt,i-R* would 
be approximately equal to λ .    
This model may provide a basis for empirical analysis of banking crisis. A relevant empirical 
methodology may be the hazards model to analyze the determinants of crisis as Hossain (2004, 
2005) applied. In this paper, Probit model is applied where response variable is defined explicitly 
on the basis of this theoretical framework.   
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5. Empirical Methods and Results 
5.1 Probit Analysis 
We estimate the probability of banking sector distress in Japan using a multivariate Probit 
model over the period 1977-2003. Semi-annual data are used. 
A bank’s profitability can be expressed as 
tuxR ttit ∀+′= β                                                            (9) 
On the basis of the theoretical framework developed in Section 4, an indicator of banking 
crisis can be defined as 


 <
=
otherwise,0
*RRif,1
y tt                                                  (10) 
where R* represents the balanced return of banks. Therefore yi = 1 represents low 
profitability or in other words, some probability of bank failure according to equation (16). 
For simplicity of analysis, we assume that Rt represents the return on asset/equity 
(ROA/ROE) of banks for a specific period of time t and R* is defined as the average return for 
the period 1970-1979 which can be representative of the long-run equilibrium return as banks 
enjoyed good financial situation during this period, as well as mostly the same return ratio they 
achieved during the bubble period (see Figure-4). Nonetheless, to decide long-run equilibrium 
return ratio is quiet a difficult task; it must be based on the judicious understanding of the 
researchers on the problems. 
To get maximum-likelihood estimates, the likelihood function of the Probit model is defined 
as  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑ ′Φ−−+′Φ=
j
jjjj xyxyL )(1ln1lnln ββ                                                      (11) 
where (.)Φ is the standard normal distribution. 
Assessing marginal effect of agency conflict 
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To see the effect of agency-conflict on the probability of failure of bank, we need to estimate 
the changes in probability by simulations. The problem is that the coefficient of Probit in 
likelihood function does not represent changes in probabilities. 
The marginal changes in the probability is 
( )
( ) .,)(
)(
meansatevaluatedx
x
yE
and
x
x
yE
ββφ
ββφ
′=
∂
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′=
∂
∂
                                                             (12) 
Now the changes in probability of bank failure with the presence/absence of agency-conflict 
can be estimated as 
Pr (yi = 1| xi = 1) - Pr (yi = 1| xi = 0) = ( )ββφ 1x′ - ( )ββφ 0x′ , at means. 
The changes in probability for the effect of other variables can also be estimated in the same 
manner. 
Variables and Data 
Semi-annual data of domestically licensed banks from Bank of Japan’s CD-ROM for the 
period 1977-2003 are used. Probit estimates are based on the availability of data of different 
variables. 
Agency-conflict variable 
An indicator variable is defined to indicate the agency problems and conflict of interest based 
on the criteria described in Table A2 of Appendix-2 and Figure 2. As the big conflicts arose 
during 1983-1989, the variable of interest takes 1 for this whole period and 0 for rest of the 
period. Although this is very difficult to assess the agency-conflict accurately, it is hoped that 
this variable could be able to capture the features of the most conflicting period in the financial 
system of Japan. According to the assumptions of theories developed in Section 4.1, the 
coefficient of agency conflict should have negative sign on y. 
Institutional and Industry-related Variables 
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Some other institutional and industry-related variables are used such as moral hazard, 
management and operating efficiency ratio, real-estate credit growth (REL ratio: Real estate loan 
outstanding/Total asset), growth of investment & security of banks as a proxy for liberalization, 
and capital adequacy requirements. Two corporate governance variables that indicate 
management efficiency are defined by two ratios: (i) I/E: interest income/interest expense and 
(ii) ME: operating expense/net income.  
The moral hazard variable is defined as an interaction of explicit deposit insurance and 
financial liberalization following Hutchison and McDill, 1998. It takes on a value of unity when 
both financial liberalization and explicit deposit insurance are observed during the specific 
period, and zero otherwise. In Japan, deposit insurance law was enacted in 1971. Since main 
deregulations came into effect in 1980 and banks started to extend credit aggressively with 
favorable high money supply growth, the moral hazard variable takes 1 for the period 1981-1990 
(as banks did not have much incentive to extend credit aggressively after 1990) and 0 for rest of 
the period. 
 Macroeconomic variables 
The macroeconomic variables are: real GDP growth, inflation, discount rate and difference in 
call rate and discount rate (interest differential). Money supply growth is not used as it creates 
distortions in probit estimation. 
The limited dependent variable y is defined on the basis of ROA (return on asset). ROA is 
defined as: Profit for the term (sum of city, regional, regional II, long term credit and trust 
bank)/Total asset minus acceptance and guarantees. On the basis of the theoretical framework 
developed in section 4, the banking distress variable is explicitly defined as   


 <
=
otherwise,0
25.0ROAif,1
yi ; where ROA*=0.25 is  obtained from the average ROA of the period 
1970-1980. This is chosen as a balanced return because during this period, banks ROA was 
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mostly stable around this figure and banks return was clustering near this figure during the 
bubble period in the 1980s too. Therefore yi represents low profitability, which in turn implies 
some probability of banking crisis.  
Results: 
Table 3 reports the probit equation estimation results for two alternative model 
specifications.  Since moral hazard and agency conflict are highly correlated, these two variables 
are estimated separately.  The estimated coefficients, robust standard errors, the number of 
observations, pseudo R2 and the percentage of crisis episodes that are correctly predicted for 
each model are reported.  
The results indicate that I/E, ME, growth of investment & security, moral hazard and agency 
conflict are statistically significant. REL ratio and capital reserve ratio are found significant in 
second model specification. Corporate governance problems (I/E and ME) and moral hazard 
problem increase the likelihood of banking crisis. Growth of investment and securities decreases 
the likelihood of banking crisis. As a part of financial liberalization, banks participation in 
securities market increased significantly from the late 1980s, which helped banks to raise their 
profit. But the policy was expected to implement more early, which might prevent from 
subsequent crisis.  
The negative sign of the agency-conflict is correct according to our theoretical assumptions. 
Agency conflicts are assumed to have occurred during 1983-89 when banks had been able to 
increase their profit by speculation, and took advantages of inefficient deregulations. So it shows 
negative sign to the response of low profitability. This speculative behavior of banks finally 
contributed to the crisis in the 1990s. Therefore, the variable agency conflict correctly predicts 
the crisis.  
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Table 3: Determinants of probability of banking sector distress 
 Probit Estimates (1982-2000) 
Determinants of banking 
sector distress 
(1) (2) 
Inflation 
Discount rate 
REL ratio 
I/E 
ME 
Interest differential  
Real GDP growth 
Capital reserve 
requirement 
Growth of investment & 
security 
Moral Hazard 
Agency conflict 
Constant 
-0.10722(0.08894) 
1.0775(1.2452) 
-167.7431(242.77) 
43.1607**(17.9415) 
0.0364**(0.0157) 
-3.1691(2.1678) 
0.16904(0.6549) 
 
1.1439(4.7671) 
 
-0.6191***(0.1942) 
4.7023*** (1.6946) 
-- 
-45.9440(30.9408) 
-0.0090(0.0693) 
-1.2056(0.8304) 
-401.414**(183.27) 
70.9444**(31.9059) 
0.0625**(0.03178) 
2.5117(2.0526) 
0.2422(0.3645) 
 
-6.8736*(4.0748) 
 
-0.3415***(0.1161) 
-- 
-5.4952**(2.4206) 
-56.3081(38.3978) 
Observations 
Pseudo R2 
Percent correctly 
predicted 
37 
0.73 
 
94.74 
37 
0.71 
 
97.37 
Note: *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Macroeconomic variables are not found significant to the low profitability or to the 
probability of banking failure. However, moral hazard and agency conflict variables capture the 
effect of growth of money supply and other policy distortions during the period (Table 3).   
Marginal Changes in probability of banking distress  
Table 4:  Marginal probability changes for moral hazard and agency conflict  
 Marginal probability 
Agency conflict Pr ( yˆ | xi = 1) - Pr ( yˆ | xi = 0) = ( )ββφ 1x′ - ( )ββφ 0x′ = 0.12 
Moral hazard Pr ( yˆ | xj = 1) - Pr ( yˆ | xj = 0) = ( )ββφ 1x′ - ( )ββφ 0x′ = 0.07 
 
Table 4 demonstrates that with the existing definition of agency conflict and moral hazard, 
there is 12% and 7% more likely to occur banking distress due to the presence of agency-conflict 
and moral hazard respectively. 
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5.2 Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) Analysis 
The VAR analysis has been performed to see the effect of policy changes on banks behavior 
and to examine whether that changes induce banks to do speculative behavior during the bubble 
period. Semi-annual data from 1977-2004 has been used for the domestically licensed banks. 
 Unrestricted VAR analysis has been performed to see the impulse responses of variables11. 
The variables that are considered: Banks credit growth (LOANGR), Growth of investment and 
securities of banks (INVGR), Consumer price index (CPI, 1990=100), Growth of money Supply 
(MONEYSUPPLY), BoJ’s Discount rate (DISC_RATE), Growth rate of GDP (GDP), Growth of 
interest rate (GINT), Agency Conflict (ACONFLICT), Moral Hazard (MORAL_HAZ), Real 
Effective Exchange Rate Appreciation (EX_Appreciation), and Banks Profitability (Y) defined 
in section 5.1.  
However, I construct several panels of VAR following Sims (1980, 1986, 1992) since VAR 
approach sometimes quiet helpful in examining the relationships among a set of economic 
variables although there are many criticisms on VAR. Consider 
                                      Vyt= ∑ Bi(Liyt) + et 
where yt denote the vector of endogenous variables, the matrices V and Bi being conformable 
with y-vector; Liyt denote the ith-lagged y-variable. The VAR is estimated with its reduced form 
as  
                                          yt = ∑ V-1Bi(Liyt) + εt ;  εt =V-1et. 
From the estimated VAR, I study the ‘innovations accounting’ that is the impulse responses 
of different variables on one standard deviation for examining structural system.  
As the ordering of the variables is important in VAR analysis, following Sims (1992) and 
empirical analysis of Ford et al. (2003), I placed the policy variables (e.g. monetary policy 
                                                 
11
 Although there is subtle evidence of cointigration but I found that the implied order of Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) model is not the appropriate method here from which we may extract impulse responses. As Canova (1995) 
mentioned that even when the data are non-stationary there is no requirement to transform the VAR into VEC for 
meaningful inferences. 
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variables) at first and than the non-policy variables such as GDP, CPI, LOANGR etc. If the 
correlations between the variables are negligible, that is if |ρij| <0.2, then ordering is immaterial. 
But this is not the case in this study.  
The Phillips-Perron test and the Breusch-Godfrey LM tests have been used to test serial 
correlation. Dickey-Fullar test has been used for testing unit root process. Since most of the 
variables are considered as growth rate, these follows I(0) processes and a few render I(1) 
process that is the first difference is necessary to become stationary. 
Figure 5 displays the impulse responses of bank credit growth to different policy shocks such as 
growth of money supply, discount rate, growth of interest rate and real effective exchange rate 
appreciation. Solid lines represent point estimates while dashed-lines denote plus-2 and minus-2 
standard deviation innovations. It is seen that money supply growth and exchange rate had negligible 
impact on banks credit extensions. But discount rate and interest rate show increasing effect on bank 
credit extensions. 
Figure 6 displays impulse response of CPI, ROA, GDP growth and investment growth to bank 
credit shocks. All these variables respond strongly to bank credit expansions. This is consistent with 
the view that bank expanded their credits to real estate business and SME market in the 1980s due to 
pressure of low profit. Moreover, it is also consistent that changes in investment and securities were 
caused by changes in bank credit, where deregulations came into effect with the access of banks to 
short-term bond market in the late 1980s. 
Figure 7 displays impulse response of bank low profitability (Y) to money supply, discount 
rate, increase of interest rate and exchange rate appreciation. Although growth of money supply 
shows some cyclical variations, other variables remain flat to the low profitability of banks. 
Therefore, it is interesting to make comments that monetary policy had negligible impact on 
banks low profitability. This finding is consistent with Hossain’s (2005) finding that banks low 
profitability is mainly generated from weak corporate governance and other problems. So it is 
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important to investigate the impact of agency conflict and moral hazard issues that arise from the 
policy inconsistencies. 
Figure 8 displays that impulse response of bank low profitability (Y) to agency conflict and 
moral hazard is negative. This is consistent with our proposition that these two issues created 
room for banks to make speculation to increase profit during the 1980s. Therefore as it is 
expected, these two variables showed negative variations with low profitability. 
Figure 9 displays strong and positive impulse response of credit growth to agency conflict 
and moral hazard. This is also consistent with the argument that moral hazard and agency 
conflict help bank to expand credit aggressively in the 1980s, which ultimately made banks 
vulnerable to crisis. In one hand, due to lack of prudential regulations, ongoing financial 
deregulations created moral hazard problem, and on the other hand, policy inconsistencies 
created conflict of interest among the respective agencies. Both the problems induced banks to 
behave aggressively which ultimately contributed to the prolonged banking crisis in Japan. 
 Figure-5: Impulse Response of bank credit growth to money supply, discount rate, growth of 
interest rate and exchange rate appreciation innovations 
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
5 10 15 20 25 30
Response of LOANGR to M2CD
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
5 10 15 20 25 30
Response of LOANGR to DISCRATE
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
5 10 15 20 25 30
Response of LOANGR to GINT
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
5 10 15 20 25 30
Response of LOANGR to EXGR
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 32 
Figure-6: Impulse Response of CPI, ROA, GDP growth rate, growth of interest rate  to banks 
credit extensions 
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Figure-7: Impulse Response of banks low profitability shocks to money supply,  
discount rate, growth of interest rate and exchange rate appreciation innovations 
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5.3 Granger Causality Test 
The Granger causality test has been performed to identify the determinants of low 
profitability of banks. The variables used are: log of asset (LASSET) as a proxy for size, call rate 
minus discount rate (DINT), interest income/interest expense (I/E) and operating efficiency 
(ME2) as a proxy for management efficiency as well as a proxy for preferential loan, growth of 
money supply (M2CD), growth of land price index (LPIND), net interest margin (PM), 
uncollateralized call rate (CR), discount rate (DR), and GDP growth (GDP) rate. 
In Table 5, the hypothesis that changes in other variables do not Granger-cause the low 
profitability (Y) is tested. Results show that all the corporate governance and institutional 
variables such as I/E, bank size (LASSET), interest differential (DINT, proxy for preferential 
loan), operating and management efficiency (ME), real estate and overall loan growth 
(RELOANGR and LOANGR), growth of investment and securities (INVGR, a proxy for 
financial deregulations), and agency conflict and moral hazard have found significant 
determinants of bank low profitability varying from 1% to 6% level of significance. On the other 
Figure-8: Impulse Response of bank low 
profitability to moral hazard and agency 
conflict 
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Table 9: Response of  agency conflict and  
moral hazard  to bank credit growth 
 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
5 10 15 20 25 30
Response of ACONFLICT to LOANGR
-1
0
1
2
5 10 15 20 25 30
Response of MORAL_HAZ to LOANGR
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 34 
hand, among the monetary and macro variables, only household savings rate, discount rate and 
collateralized call rate, are found highly significant to the detainments of low profitability. 
money supply and GDP growth rate have been found as significant at around 10% level of 
significance. The results are consistent with Probit estimates except the significance of DINT and 
DR.                  
            Table 5: Granger-causality tests 
                   (Hypotheis tested: Changes in other variables do not Granger-cause the changes in Y) 
Variables F-statistic Probability Lags #  observations 
Corporate governance/ Institutional 
variables 
I/E+ 
LASSET 
DINT 
ME+ 
Reloangr 
Loangr 
Invgr 
Aconflict 
Moral Hazard 
Monetary/Macro variables 
M2CD 
LPIND+ 
PM+ 
HHSR+ 
GDP 
DR 
CR 
 
 
4.73 
2.54 
3.50 
7.34 
2.79 
3.05 
2.40 
2.84 
5.05 
 
2.72 
3.29 
0.61 
2.48 
2.25 
3.28 
3.45 
 
 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.05 
0.06 
0.01 
 
0.08 
0.13 
0.13 
0.00 
0.11 
0.02 
0.01 
 
 
2 
7 
4 
2 
7 
8 
9 
2 
2 
 
2 
7 
7 
2 
2 
5 
5 
 
 
-- 
42 
45 
-- 
41 
41 
38 
47 
47 
 
47 
-- 
-- 
-- 
44 
42 
44 
           Note: 1. + indicates yearly data are used on the basis of availability and suitability of data; 
 
 
6. Summaries and Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the “agency-conflict” of the 1980s as a potential cause of Japanese 
banking crisis in the subsequent decades of the 1990s and the early 2000s. The issue brings 
renewed interest in the policy evaluation process of the then ongoing financial deregulations of 
the 1980s. Although much have been said about the policy inconsistencies of that period, it was 
not streamlined as potential cause of subsequent crisis. This paper provides much emphasis on 
“agency-conflict” because it encompasses all the major three influential views on the causality of 
crisis: slow and undirected financial deregulation, monetary policy inconsistency and corporate 
governance of banks. Moreover, the causality of crisis is of great concern as the crisis has not 
stabilized completely yet because the recent failure occurred in 2003 and a big banking holding 
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company UFJ has planned to be merged with another big bank holding company Tokyo-
Mitsubishi group in 2005 due to financial problems.  
The determinants of banking crisis have been analyzed in many papers, but the agency 
conflict that made the financial deregulations delayed and derailed, is addressed in this paper for 
the first time with theoretical and empirical illustration that it might have significant effect on the 
subsequent crisis. This paper argues that the agency conflict i.e. conflict of interest among the 
agencies, e.g. fiscal and monetary authorities, financial intermediaries, debtor companies etc. 
during the ongoing deregulation process in the 1980s had aroused due to heteroschedasticity in 
policy shifts and weak corporate governance of banks. 
The theoretical model that is developed in this paper explains the inefficiencies of policies 
during early stage of liberalization process, and how a bank can be vulnerable to crisis at the 
outset of the asset price bubble. This model is used as the basis of empirical analyses to identify 
the causality of “probability of crisis” by the Probit model, as well as VAR analysis and Granger 
causality tests. The model would be helpful to outline similar types of further empirical analyses.  
The analysis indicates that “agency-conflict” as the outcome of counteracts between 
‘heteroschedasticity in policy shift’ and ‘weak corporate governance’ was crucial for the 
Japanese banking crisis. Empirical results also show that macroeconomic factors have little 
impact on the crisis; rather the industry-related and institutional factors have been more 
significant to the crisis. Corporate governance and agency conflict have been found significant to 
the probability of crisis. This finding can be thought of as an extension of Hossain’s (2005) 
findings. 
The findings provide a suggestion that if the financial deregulations are not carried out 
carefully, it may create agency-conflict in the financial sector, as well as it may create a ground 
for financial crisis too. It also suggests that the financial deregulations were needed to be 
accompanied with some necessary measures to (i) make the banks capable of doing business 
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without depending on the big corporate groups, that is banks were being able to participate in 
securities business at the very beginning of deregulation, (ii) to improve the corporate 
governance of the banks that are able to handle the situation in a liberalized environment, and 
(iii) prepare prudential regulations so that bank can not make any speculative decision.  The 
findings would be instructive to similar types of financial system that opt for financial 
deregulations. 
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APPEDIX-1 
 
Diagram-A1: Banks’ Scope of Businesses 
(Source: Japanese Bankers Association-JBA) 
 
        Typical bank businesses            Taking of deposits and installment savings 
                                                           -Lending, discounting of bills and notes  
                                                            Transfer of funds 
         
      -  Ancillary businesses                 Guarantees, bills acceptance 
                                                          -Trading of securities, securities options etc. 
                                                          - Securities lending 
                                                          - Underwriting of government bonds 
                                                          - Acquisition and ceding of monetary claims 
                                                          - Arrangement for private placement 
                                                          - Subscription agency for local government, corporate bonds  
                                                          - Others 
      - Securities business                     Retail sells and dealing govt. bonds                                  
                                                    -  Retail sells of investment trust 
                                                            OTC transaction of securities derivatives 
     - Insurance business                  __ Retail sales of insurance products such as fire insurance etc. 
 
       Peripheral businesses                  Leasing 
      -Venture capital 
      -Management consultation 
      - Investment advisory services 
Other 
 
Figure-A1: Different indicators of the Japanese economy during 1964-2003 
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APPENDIX-2 
 
Table A2: Agency conflicting issues 
 
# of Conflict Events Conflicted with Conflicting 
period 
Response by 
banks 
Comments Conflict 
0 
(Reduction of 
dependency 
on corporate 
groups) 
Removal of 
restrictions for 
corporations on 
fund raising in 
securities 
market:  
1980- onward. 
 
Objective: To 
decrease 
dependency on 
banks 
Banking 
institutions are 
allowed to 
participate in 
short-term 
government bond 
market from 
1987 (6-month 
bond) and 1989 
(3-month bond) 
[As a 
compensation to 
reduced 
dependency of 
large corporate 
groups] 
1980-87/89 
Banks did not 
find any 
alternative 
source of profit 
with decrease of 
large corporate 
groups 
dependency on 
bank during this 
period 
Credit 
extensions to 
Real Estate 
and SME 
market 
aggressively 
Lack of 
prudential 
regulations help 
them to make a 
room for moral 
hazard 
Conflict of 
interest between 
banks and large 
corporate 
groups 
1 
(Deregulation 
of 
shareholding/ 
Corporate 
governance) 
Interlocking 
shares needed 
to be reduced to 
5% by 1987. 
Still shareholding 
are significantly 
prevalent; 
employee-
shareholders and 
non-bank 
shareholders 
have less 
influence on 
bank 
management 
1980-89 Aggressive 
credit 
extensions, 
Management 
was not 
efficient to 
anticipate 
asset price 
fluctuations 
and to find 
alternative 
Weak corporate 
governance  
 
Conflict for 
policy 
inconsistensy 
 40 
mode of 
investment 
2-3   1981-82    
4 
(Monetary 
policy 
inconsistency) 
Money supply 
(M2+CD) 
started to 
increase during 
1983-89 
Interest rate 
decrease (1983-
85)(1988-89) 
1983-89 Credit 
extension to 
SMEs and 
Real Estate: 
the asset price 
bubble in 
1988-89 
During financial 
deregulation, the 
growth rate of 
money supply 
might be a 
misleading signal  
 
Time Conflict 
with fiscal 
authority 
regarding fiscal 
expansion; time 
conflict with 
implementation 
of monetary 
policy 
5   1983-85    
6 
(Monetary 
Easing vs 
Fiscal Policy) 
Monetary 
easing 
(discount rate 
lowered from 
5% to 2.5%): 
1986-87 
Fiscal expansion 
as well as banks 
Corporate 
governance 
1986-87 Credit 
extensions 
aggressively 
Asset price 
bubble started to 
emerge  
Conflict of 
monetary policy 
with fiscal and 
exchange rate 
policy 
7   1987-88  Bubble created  
8 
(Monetary 
tightening) 
Discount rate 
increased 1988-
89 
Early expansion 
of fiscal policy 
vs. monetary 
policy 
1988-89 Bankruptcy of 
creditor and 
debtor 
companies 
Bubble burst in 
1990 
Conflict of 
interest among 
financial 
intermediaries 
Note: The issues are discussed in detail in Section 3. 
 
 
 
 
